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PinnacleAR

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  1. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Mrs. PINNACLE (for herself, with thanks to Mr. GRAHAM, Mr. COONS, Mr. TILLIS, and Mr. BOOKER) introduced the following bill which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary A BILL To ensure independent investigations and judicial review of the removal of a special counsel, and for other purposes Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the “Special Counsel Independence and Integrity Act”. SEC. 2. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SPECIAL COUNSEL. (a) In General.—Part II of title 28, United States Code, is amended by inserting after chapter 40A the following: “CHAPTER 40B—SPECIAL COUNSEL “Sec. “599K–1. Grounds for appointing a Special Counsel. “599K–2. Alternatives available to the Attorney General. “599K–3. Qualifications of the Special Counsel. “599K–4. Jurisdiction. “599K–5. Staff. “599K–6. Powers and authority. “599K–7. Conduct and accountability generally. “599K–8. Limitation on removal of Special Counsel and certain other officials. “599K–9. Notification and reports by the Special Counsel. “599K–10. Notification and reports by the Attorney General. “599K–11. No creation of rights. “§ 599K–1. Grounds for appointing a Special Counsel “(a) In General.—The Attorney General shall appoint a Special Counsel if the Attorney General determines that— “(1) criminal investigation of a person or matter is warranted; “(2) investigation or prosecution of the person or matter described in paragraph (1) by the office of a United States attorney or litigating Division of the Department of Justice (in this chapter referred to as the ‘Department’) would present a conflict of interest for the Department or other extraordinary circumstances; and “(3) under the circumstances, it would be in the public interest to appoint an outside Special Counsel to assume responsibility for the matter. “(b) Recusal.—The Attorney General who has been confirmed to that position by the Senate or, in the case of the vacancy, absence, disability, or recusal of the Attorney General, the most senior Senate-confirmed officer of the Department listed in section 508 who is not recused from the matter shall exercise the authority under this chapter. “§ 599K–2. Alternatives available to the Attorney General “(a) In General.—When matters are brought to the attention of the Attorney General that might warrant consideration of appointment of a Special Counsel, the Attorney General may— “(1) appoint a Special Counsel in accordance with this chapter; “(2) direct that an initial investigation, consisting of such factual inquiry or legal research as the Attorney General determines appropriate, be conducted in order to better inform the decision; or “(3) conclude that under the circumstances of the matter, the public interest would not be served by removing the investigation from the normal processes of the Department, and that the appropriate component of the Department should handle the matter. “(b) Additional Direction.—If the Attorney General reaches a conclusion described in subsection (a)(3), the Attorney General may direct that appropriate steps be taken to mitigate any conflicts of interest, such as recusal of particular officials. “§ 599K–3. Qualifications of the Special Counsel “(a) In General.—An individual named as Special Counsel under this chapter shall be— “(1) a lawyer with a reputation for integrity and impartial decision-making, and with appropriate experience to ensure both that the investigation will be conducted ably, expeditiously, and thoroughly, and that investigative and prosecutorial decisions will be supported by an informed understanding of the criminal law and Department policies; and “(2) selected from outside the United States Government. “(b) Priority Of Investigation.—An individual named as Special Counsel under this chapter shall agree that the responsibilities of the individual as Special Counsel shall take first precedence in the professional life of the individual, and that it may be necessary to work full time on the investigation, depending on the complexity of the investigation and the stage of the investigation. “(c) Appointment Method.— “(1) IN GENERAL.—The Attorney General shall consult with the Assistant Attorney General for Administration to ensure an appropriate method of appointment, and to ensure that a Special Counsel undergoes an appropriate background investigation and a detailed review of ethics and conflicts of interest issues. “(2) CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEE.—A Special Counsel shall be appointed as a confidential employee, as described in section 7511(b)(2)(C) of title 5. “§ 599K–4. Jurisdiction “(a) Original Jurisdiction.— “(1) IN GENERAL.—The jurisdiction of a Special Counsel appointed under this chapter shall be established by the Attorney General, and shall include the authority to investigate and prosecute Federal crimes committed in the course of, and with intent to interfere with, the Special Counsel’s investigation, such as perjury, obstruction of justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of witnesses, and to conduct appeals arising out of the matter being investigated or prosecuted. “(2) STATEMENT OF THE MATTER TO BE INVESTIGATED.—The Special Counsel shall be provided with a specific factual statement of the matter to be investigated. “(b) Additional Jurisdiction.—If in the course of the investigation by a Special Counsel appointed under this chapter, the Special Counsel concludes that additional jurisdiction beyond that specified in the original jurisdiction is necessary in order to fully investigate and resolve the matters assigned, or to investigate new matters that come to light in the course of the investigation, the Special Counsel shall consult with the Attorney General, who shall determine whether to include the additional matters within the jurisdiction of the Special Counsel or assign them elsewhere. “(c) Civil And Administrative Jurisdiction.— “(1) IN GENERAL.—If in the course of an investigation by a Special Counsel appointed under this chapter, the Special Counsel determines that administrative remedies, civil sanctions, or other governmental action outside the criminal justice system might be appropriate, the Special Counsel shall consult with the Attorney General with respect to the appropriate component to take any necessary action. “(2) LIMITATION.—A Special Counsel appointed under this chapter shall not have civil or administrative authority unless specifically granted such jurisdiction by the Attorney General. “§ 599K–5. Staff “(a) In General.—A Special Counsel appointed under this chapter may request the assignment of appropriate personnel of the Department to assist the Special Counsel. The Department shall gather and provide the Special Counsel with the names and resumes of appropriate personnel available for detail. The Special Counsel may also request the detail of specific personnel, and the office for which the designated personnel work shall make reasonable efforts to accommodate the request. “(b) Assignment Of Duties.—A Special Counsel appointed under this chapter shall assign the duties and supervise the work of personnel while they are assigned to the Special Counsel. “(c) Hiring Of Additional Personnel.—If necessary, a Special Counsel appointed under this chapter may request that additional personnel be hired or assigned from outside the Department. “(d) Cooperation.—All personnel in the Department shall cooperate to the fullest extent possible with a Special Counsel appointed under this chapter. “§ 599K–6. Powers and authority “(a) In General.—Subject to the limitations of this chapter, a Special Counsel appointed under this chapter shall exercise, within the scope of the jurisdiction of the Special Counsel, the full power and independent authority to exercise all investigative and prosecutorial functions of any United States attorney. “(b) Special Counsel Discretion.—Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a Special Counsel appointed under this chapter shall determine whether and to what extent to inform or consult with the Attorney General or others within the Department about the conduct of the duties and responsibilities of the Special Counsel. “§ 599K–7. Conduct and accountability generally “(a) In General.—A Special Counsel appointed under this chapter shall— “(1) comply with the rules, regulations, procedures, practices, and policies of the Department; and “(2) consult with appropriate offices within the Department for guidance with respect to established practices, policies, and procedures of the Department, including ethics and security regulations and procedures. “(b) Extraordinary Circumstances.—If a Special Counsel appointed under this chapter determines that the extraordinary circumstances of any particular decision would render compliance with required review and approval procedures by the designated departmental component inappropriate, the Special Counsel may consult directly with the Attorney General. “(c) Limitation On Supervision.— “(1) IN GENERAL.—A Special Counsel appointed under this chapter shall not be subject to the day-to-day supervision of any official of the Department, except that the Attorney General may request that the Special Counsel provide an explanation for any investigative or prosecutorial step, and may after review conclude that the action is so inappropriate or unwarranted under established practices of the Department that it should not be pursued. “(2) REVIEW.—In conducting a review described in paragraph (1), the Attorney General shall give great weight to the views of the Special Counsel. If the Attorney General concludes that a proposed action by a Special Counsel should not be pursued, the Attorney General shall notify Congress in accordance with section 599K–10(a)(3). “(d) Disciplinary Action For Misconduct.—A Special Counsel appointed under this chapter, and any staff of the Special Counsel, shall be subject to disciplinary action for misconduct and breach of ethical duties under the same standards and to the same extent as are other employees of the Department. Inquiries into such matters shall be handled through the appropriate office of the Department upon the approval of the Attorney General. “§ 599K–8. Limitation on removal of Special Counsel and certain other officials “(a) In General.—A Special Counsel appointed under this chapter, or any other official appointed by the Attorney General who exercises a similar degree of independence from the normal chain of command of the Department, may be removed from office only by the personal action of an Attorney General who has been confirmed to that position by the Senate, or the most senior Senate-confirmed officer of the Department listed in section 508 who is not recused from the matter. “(b) Removal For Cause.—A Special Counsel or other appointed official described in subsection (a) may be removed only for misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or other good cause, including violation of policies of the Department. “(c) Notice Of Removal.— “(1) IN GENERAL.—The Attorney General or other Department official described in subsection (a), as the case may be, shall provide written notice to the Special Counsel or other appointed official described in subsection (a) of the specific reason or reasons for the removal. “(2) EFFECTIVE DATE OF REMOVAL.—Except as provided in subsection (e), removal under this section shall become effective on the date that is 10 days after the date on which the written notice was provided under paragraph (1). “(d) Timing.—Not later than 10 days after the date on which written notice was provided under subsection (c)(1), the Special Counsel or other appointed official described in subsection (a), as the case may be, may file an action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia challenging the removal in accordance with subsection (e). “(e) Review.— “(1) IN GENERAL.—An individual that received written notice under subsection (c)(1) may file an action in accordance with paragraph (2) that the removal was in violation of this chapter. “(2) REQUIREMENTS.—Any action filed under this subsection shall be heard and determined by a court of 3 judges not later than 14 days after the date on which the action is filed in accordance with the provisions of section 2284, and an appeal of any final decision shall lie to the Supreme Court. “(3) RELIEF.—If a court determines that the removal of the individual who filed an action under this subsection violates this chapter, the removal shall not take effect. The court may also provide other appropriate relief. “(4) STATUS DURING PROCEEDINGS.— “(A) IN GENERAL.—At the request of the individual who filed an action under this subsection, the court shall determine whether the individual shall remain in office during the pendency of the action described in paragraph (2). If an individual makes such a request, the court shall order that the effective date of the removal shall be stayed until the court rules on the request. “(B) PRESERVATION OF MATERIALS.—During the pendency of an action filed under this subsection, the personnel, documents, and materials of the Special Counsel or other appointed official described in subsection (a) shall be preserved. “(C) LIMITATION.—During the pendency of an action filed under this subsection, a replacement for the Special Counsel or other appointed official described in subsection (a) who is challenging the removal shall not be designated. “§ 599K–9. Notification and reports by the Special Counsel “(a) Budget.— “(1) IN GENERAL.—A Special Counsel appointed under this chapter shall be provided all appropriate resources by the Department. “(2) PROPOSED BUDGET.—Not later than 60 days after the date on which a Special Counsel is appointed under this chapter, the Special Counsel shall develop a proposed budget for the current fiscal year with the assistance of the Justice Management Division for review and approval by the Attorney General. “(3) ESTABLISHMENT OF BUDGET.—Based on a proposal developed under paragraph (2), the Attorney General shall establish a budget for the operations of the Special Counsel, which shall include a request for assignment of personnel, with a description of the qualifications needed. “(4) ADDITIONAL BUDGET REQUESTS.—After a budget has been established under paragraph (3), the Special Counsel shall, not later than 90 days before the beginning of each fiscal year, report to the Attorney General the status of the investigation, and provide a budget request for the following fiscal year. The Attorney General shall determine whether the investigation should continue and, if so, establish the budget for the next fiscal year. “(b) Notification Of Significant Events.—A Special Counsel appointed under this chapter shall notify the Attorney General of events in the course of the investigation by the Special Counsel in conformity with the guidelines of the Department with respect to Urgent Reports. “(c) Closing Documentation.— “(1) IN GENERAL.—At the conclusion of the work of a Special Counsel appointed under this chapter, the Special Counsel shall submit to the Attorney General, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, and the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives a report detailing the factual findings of the investigation and explaining the prosecution or declination decisions reached by the Special Counsel. If the Attorney General granted or denied a request from the Special Counsel to change the Special Counsel’s jurisdiction under section 599K–4(b), that information shall be included. “(2) INFORMATION REQUIRED.—The report submitted under paragraph (1) shall include information regarding significant prosecutorial decisions and significant expenditures by the Office of the Special Counsel. “§ 599K–10. Notification and reports by the Attorney General “(a) In General.—If the Attorney General appoints a Special Counsel under this chapter, the Attorney General shall submit to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate and the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives a written notification, with a report explaining— “(1) the appointment of the Special Counsel; “(2) the intent of the Attorney General to remove the Special Counsel; and “(3) after the conclusion of the investigation of the Special Counsel, to the extent consistent with applicable law, any instance in which the Attorney General concluded that a proposed action by a Special Counsel was so inappropriate or unwarranted under established Departmental practices that it should not be pursued. “(b) Notice Of Appointment.—A notification and report under subsection (a)(1) shall— “(1) be submitted on the date on which the Special Counsel is appointed; and “(2) include— “(A) the factual basis necessitating the appointment of the Special Counsel, including a description of any effort made before appointing the Special Counsel to mitigate potential conflicts of interests of relevant individuals or within relevant components; and “(B) a specific factual statement of the matter to be investigated. “(c) Notice Of Removal.—A notification and report under subsection (a)(2) shall— “(1) be submitted not later than 30 days before the date on which notice is provided to the Special Counsel under section 599K–8(c)(1); and “(2) include the reasons for the removal. “§ 599K–11. No creation of rights “Except as provided in section 599K–8, this chapter shall not be construed to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity, by any person or entity, in any matter, civil, criminal, or administrative.”. (b) Table Of Chapters.—The table of chapters for part II of title 28, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to chapter 40A the following: “40B. Special Counsel 599K–1”. (c) Application To Existing Special Counsel.— (1) IN GENERAL.—For purposes of applying chapter 40B of title 28, United States Code, as added by this Act, to a Special Counsel who is subject to any provision of part 600 of title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, and who is serving as a Special Counsel on the date of enactment of this Act— (A) in addition to the authority under which the Special Counsel was originally appointed, the Special Counsel shall be deemed to be a Special Counsel appointed under such chapter 40B; and (B) such chapter 40B shall apply for purposes of any action described in such chapter 40B by or with respect to the Special Counsel taken on after the date of enactment of this Act (including removing the Special Counsel from office). (2) REMOVAL BEFORE ENACTMENT.— (A) IN GENERAL.—Section 599K–8 of title 28, United States Code, as added by this Act, shall apply with respect to an individual who was— (i) appointed as a Special Counsel after January 1, 2017; (ii) subject to any provision of part 600 of title 28, Code of Federal Regulations; and (iii) removed from office before the date of enactment of this Act. (B) IMPLEMENTATION.—If there is a Special Counsel who is described in subparagraph (A)— (i) not later than 10 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Attorney General shall provide written notice relating to the removal— (I) to the Special Counsel, that provides the information required under section 599K–8(c)(1) of title 28, United States Code, as added by this Act; and (II) to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate and the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, that provides the information required under section 599K–10(c)(2) of such title; (ii) not later than 10 days after the date on which written notice is provided under clause (i)(I), the Special Counsel may file an action challenging the removal in accordance with section 599K–8(e) of such title; (iii) in an action filed under clause (ii), the court shall determine whether the removal of the Special Counsel meets the requirements for removal under subsections (a), (b), and (c)(1) of section 599K–8 of such title; and (iv) if a court determines that the removal of the individual who filed an action under clause (ii) violates a requirement described in clause (iii), the court may order reinstatement or provide other appropriate relief. (d) Severability.—If any provision of this Act, or an amendment made by this Act, or the application of such provision or amendment to any person or circumstance is held to be invalid or unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, and the amendments made by this Act, and the application of such provisions and amendments to any person or circumstance shall remain and shall not be affected thereby.
  2. PinnacleAR

    Leading Human Spaceflight Act

    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Mrs. PINNACLE (for herself and Mr. BABIN; and with thanks to Mr. NELSON, the last member of the U.S. legislative branch to serve as NASA Payload Specialist) introduced the following bill which was referred to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. A BILL To specify goals and objectives of the United States with respect to human spaceflight, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the “Leading Human Spaceflight Act”. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress finds the following: (1) The Apollo 11 landing on July 20, 1969, marked the first steps of a human being on the surface of another world, representing a giant leap for all humanity and a significant demonstration of the spaceflight capabilities of the United States. (2) Section 202(a) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Act of 2010 (42 U.S.C. 18312(a)) establishes for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration the long-term goals of expanding human presence in space and establishing a thriving space economy in low-Earth orbit and beyond. (3) The National Security Strategy of the United States of America issued in December 2017 designates the human exploration of the solar system as a strategic priority for the United States. (4) Establishing and ensuring the sustainability of human space exploration of the solar system, as called for in Space Policy Directive–1 issued in December 2017 and the National Space Exploration Campaign issued in September 2018, will require carrying out human exploration and related extravehicular activities on the surface of other celestial bodies in a safe and cost-effective manner. (5) The Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center has decades of experience working with international partners, other government agencies, and partners in industry and academia to study, develop, and carry out the human spaceflight priorities of the United States. SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center is critical to the achievement of the civil space mission of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration in the areas of program management and integration of large complex human spaceflight programs, including overall systems engineering and integration, human health and safety in space, and crewed spacecraft development and operations, especially those outlined in the National Space Exploration Campaign; (2) the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center’s unique flagship facilities, capabilities and experience in human spaceflight operations and program management, including astronaut training, program integration and mission control, have been vital to human spaceflight achievements of the United States since the 1960s and will continue to serve a vital role in maintaining a permanent human presence in low-Earth orbit, as well as successfully carrying out the National Space Exploration Campaign; (3) the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center should continue its leadership in human spaceflight and exploration through its role as the home of the United States astronaut corps, mission operations, the International Space Station Program, the Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle Program, astro-materials research and exploration science, and contributions to projects which extend human space exploration beyond low-Earth orbit, such as the Gateway and other capabilities envisioned by the National Space Exploration Campaign; (4) human space exploration programs of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, including, but not limited to those described in the National Space Exploration Campaign, should rely on the experienced workforce and core capabilities of the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center, to serve as a lead center for program management, systems engineering, program integration, and operations, to the extent practicable; (5) conducting human space exploration and maintaining a human presence at any destination or outpost in low-Earth orbit and beyond, as called for in the National Space Exploration Campaign, expands the sphere of influence of the United States; (6) successfully conducting the National Space Exploration Campaign depends on a broad base of technical and operational expertise and core capabilities provided by the NASA centers and industry partners; (7) the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center’s role as a leading source of such expertise and capabilities makes it an important driver of economic activity in the United States; (8) the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center has a tremendous opportunity to take a leadership role in promoting broader economic engagement with the commercial, academic, and industrial entities in the United States and globally; and (9) the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center shall have a primary role in the development, integration and operations of space and supporting systems critical to the National Space Exploration Campaign, including major systems elements and key infrastructure operated in the vicinity of— (A) low-Earth orbit; (B) the Moon; (C) Mars or its moons; or (D) any other destinations pursuant to the objectives specified in section 202(1) of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 2010 (42 U.S.C. 18312(a)). SEC. 4. POLICY. It is the policy of the United States to continue a human presence capability in low-Earth orbit and that such capability— (1) maintains the United States global leadership and relationships with partners and allies; (2) contributes to the general welfare of the United States; and (3) shall be affordable as to not preclude a robust portfolio of other human space exploration activities. SEC. 5. INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION. (a) Authorized Operations.—The International Space Station, as long as it is safe and functional, shall operate through at least September 30, 2030, or until a demonstrated and sustainable lower cost alternative low-Earth orbit platform can achieve the mission objectives of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, including but not limited to: (1) Conducting scientific, exploration and human research programs to extend our human presence beyond low-Earth orbit. (2) Benefiting life on Earth. (3) Increasing U.S. economic competitiveness and commercial participation. (b) Authorized ISS Activities.—The International Space Station shall continue scientific and research programs and serve as a testbed to enable and advance technology development and space operations capabilities for deep space exploration and to foster and encourage commercial activities in low-Earth orbit. (c) Commercial Capabilities.—In order to facilitate the growth of commercial participants and activities, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall work with the private sector to develop commercial capabilities in low-Earth orbit that can achieve the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s objectives. By December 31, 2024, NASA or a partner organization should attempt to achieve the following: (1) A product produced or manufactured aboard the ISS or in low-Earth orbit by a private entity has been successfully marketed and sold. (2) Any U.S. non-governmental user of the ISS has paid some or all of the costs of payload integration or transportation to the ISS. (3) A non-NASA, U.S. government customer flies a scientific or research payload on board the ISS. (4) The United States flight of a crew member aboard the ISS on a commercial basis wherein their time is available for purchase by ISS users. (5) A non-U.S. entity, not currently covered by the ISS Intergovernmental Agreement, notwithstanding other provisions of law, purchase or acquire a presence on or services from the ISS. (d) ISS Transition Strategy.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration shall deliver to the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of the Senate a strategy that— (1) provides clear guidance on how the National Aeronautics and Space Administration will ensure a stepwise transition to an eventual successor platform consistent with the ISS Transition Principles specified in the International Space Station Transition Report issued pursuant to the section 50111(c)(2) of title 51, United States Code, on March 30, 2018; (2) includes capability driven milestones and timelines leading to such a transition; (3) takes into account the importance of maintaining workforce expertise, core capabilities and continuity at National Aeronautics and Space Administration centers, including those primarily focused on human spaceflight; (4) considers how any such transition affects current partnerships; (5) presents opportunities for future engagement with— (A) current international partners; (B) countries with growing spaceflight capabilities, where not precluded by other provisions of law; (C) private sector; and (D) other United States Government users; and (6) promotes the continued economic development of low-Earth orbit.
  3. LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS - Newly-elected Congresswoman and former Secretary of State Mary Blythe-Pinnacle gave a guest presentation at the Pinnacle Institute for American Security and Prosperity, where she discussed current domestic challenges to national security and how to solve them from both within and without a polarized government. Following the presentation, attendees--including members of the press--were invited to ask questions and express any of their concerns.
  4. OFFICE OF MARY BLYTHE-PINNACLE U.S. Representative for Arkansas
  5. PinnacleAR

    Pinnacle Returns to Washington

    Mary Blythe-Pinnacle OFFICE OF MARY BLYTHE-PINNACLE U.S. Representative for Arkansas View full PR
  6. PinnacleAR

    Mary Blythe-Pinnacle (Democrat)

    Character Name: Mary Blythe-Pinnacle Home State: Arkansas Previous Job: Government (Lobbyist, Community Organizer, Former Cabinet Secretary, Agency head, or lower rank) Date of Birth: 08/18/1954 Race / Ethnicity: White Religion: Protestant Christian Wealth: Upper Class Gender: Female Sexuality: Heterosexual Are you married?: Yes How many children do you have?: 2 Mary Blythe-Pinnacle is the former Secretary of State of the United States, wife of former Republican Governor of Arkansas David Pinnacle, and mother of former Congressmen Henry (AR) and Bobby (VA) Pinnacle. She recently served as Executive Vice President of Lockheed Martin and is Chair Emeritus of the Pinnacle Institute for American Security and Prosperity. Education B.A. in Political Science, History, and International Affairs (1976), Egregia Cum Laude - University of Arkansas at Little Rock Master of Public Administration (1978) - Harvard University Juris Doctorate (1981) - Harvard University Work History 1980 - 1981: President, Harvard Law Review, Harvard University (Cambridge, MA) 1982 - 1987: Adjunct Professor of International Law, University of Arkansas School of Law; Professor of Global Affairs, University of Arkansas (Little Rock, AR) 1987 - 1994: Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs and International Security, University of Arkansas (Little Rock, AR) 1993 - 1994: Special Advisor to the President for Global Security & Development, Office of the President of the United States (Washington, DC) 1994 - 1997: Undersecretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, U.S. Department of State (Washington, DC) 1997 - 2001: U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State (Washington, DC) 2002 - 2010: Co-Founder & Chair, The Pinnacle Institute for American Security and Prosperity (PIASP) (Little Rock, AR) 2010 - 2018: Chair Emeritus, PIASP; Professor Emeritus, University of Arkansans School of Law (Little Rock, AR) 2010 - 2018: Executive Vice President, Lockheed Martin International, Lockheed Martin (Bethesda, MD) Publications “Strong and Wrong: Why Authoritarian Regimes Always Fail” (1987), book “Political Sovereignty: Partisanism as a Destruction of Law and Order” (1992), book “Contemporary Issues in Global Security and Economics” (1993), textbook “Walls: Being America’s Ambassador in a Time of Global Divison” (2002), biography “Death of Democracy: Domestic Conflict as a Cause of Democratic Destruction” (2017), textbook View full character
  7. PinnacleAR

    Disarm Hizballah Act

    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Mrs. PINNACLE (for herself and Mr. SUOZZI) introduced the following bill, which was referred to the Committee on Intelligence (Permanent Select), in addition to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned. A BILL To direct the Director of National Intelligence to prepare a National Intelligence Estimate on Hizballah, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the “Disarm Hizballah Act”. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress makes the following findings: (1) The Department of State designated Hiz­bal­lah as a terrorist organization in 1997. (2) Hizballah constitutes a grave and present danger to the United States and the interests and allies of the United States by conducting armed interference in multiple conflicts, most notably those of Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. (3) Hizballah has been sanctioned under the Hizballah International Financing Prevention Act of 2015 and designated pursuant to multiple executive orders and provisions of law to deter and prevent the financing of Hizballah’s operations. While impactful, the diverse and deadly arsenal of Hizballah, its procurement, and its continuous expansion have not been addressed. (4) The illegal transfer of weapons to Hizballah constitutes an imminent danger to the Middle East and the allies of the United States, as these weapons foment instability in an already volatile region. (5) According to an outgoing commander of the Israel Air Force, Israel has attacked dozens of convoys bringing arms to Hizballah and other groups on several Israeli fronts, including from Syria, over the past 5 years. (6) Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (hereinafter referred to as “UNIFIL”) has a responsibility to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in taking steps towards the establishment of an area free of armed personnel, assets, and weapons other than those of the Lebanese government and of UNIFIL. (7) Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1701 (2006), 2373 (2017), and 1559 (2004), all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias should disband and disarm, and the borders of Lebanon must be secured with a full deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces as the only armed representative of the State. (8) As noted in numerous reports discussing the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006) no disarmament of Hizballah has occurred, and the borders of Lebanon, particularly in southern Lebanon, are not secure. (9) Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006) the sale or supply to any entity or individual within Lebanon of arms and related material shall be prevented. (10) In September 2017, the mandate of UNIFIL was expanded to allow it to take all necessary action to stop its area of operations from being used for hostile activities and to step up its patrols and inspections to disrupt Hizballah’s illicit activities. (11) Pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231, without proper authorization from the United Nations Security Council, it is forbidden to import, export, or re-export to, into, or from Iran, whether directly or indirectly, any significant arms or arms-related material. SEC. 3. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING UNIFIL AND HIZBALLAH. It is the policy of the United States to— (1) strengthen UNIFIL efforts to demilitarize southern Lebanon and neutralize the missile capabilities of Hizballah; (2) use all available diplomatic, legislative, and economic means to detect and deter the illegal transfer of weapons from Iran to Hizballah, both regionally and internationally; (3) implement the weapons embargo established in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 and to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 and the Taif accords, among other international resolutions; and (4) work with the Government of Lebanon, UNIFIL, and regional partners to develop a milestone timeline to implement a strategy towards the disarmament of Hizballah. SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN NEUTRALIZING HIZ­BAL­LAH. It is the Sense of Congress that the United States should— (1) cooperate closely with the Government of Israel in working to neutralize the capabilities of Hizballah and definitively halting the illegal transfer of weapons to and procurement of weapons for Hizballah; and (2) engage the Government of Lebanon to tactically secure its borders and disarm all militias operating in Lebanon. SEC. 5. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE ON HIZ­BAL­LAH. Not later than 90 days after enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall commission and produce a National Intelligence Estimate on Hizballah. Such National Intelligence Estimate shall include each of the following: (1) A full accounting of the entirety of Hizballah’s rocket arsenal. (2) An evaluation of the success of the UNIFIL mandate. (3) An evaluation of the tactical capabilities of Hizballah, including such capabilities related to defense. (4) A detailed description of the supply routes used in the illegal procurement of weapons for Hizballah. (5) An estimate on the international operations that support Hizballah’s network. (6) An accounting of the effects of the interference of Hizballah in conflicts through the Middle East region. (7) An assessment of how Hizballah raises, holds, and spends funds in territories where UNIFIL operates.
  8. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Mrs. PINNACLE (for herself) introduced the following bill A BILL To require a report on the possible exploitation of virtual currencies by terrorist actors, to authorize a competition program to identify regulatory solutions and develop technology with respect to counter terror threat financing, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the “Stop Terrorist Use of Virtual Currencies Act”. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. The Congress finds the following: (1) Virtual currencies (VC) provide low-cost, high-speed means for verified transactions. (2) When used positively, VCs unite disparate financial markets and provide a convenient means for a number of constituencies, including the economically marginalized, to conduct transactions cheaply across large geographic expanses. (3) Simultaneously, to the extent regulatory frameworks are premised on institution-based transactions, VCs could be exploited by terrorists and cybercriminals to fund untraceable operations. (4) According to the Center for New American Security (CNAS), if VCs become sufficiently liquid and easily convertible, and terrorist groups acquire technical infrastructure needed to support VC activity at a significant scale, VCs could pose a highly dangerous threat to the United States and its partners. (5) The Committee on Financial Services issued a report entitled, “Stopping Terror Finance: Securing the U.S. Financial Sector” in December, 2016, which includes numerous recommendations to enhance a whole-of-government approach towards counter terrorist financing. SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. It is the Sense of Congress that— (1) to the extent current statutes require financial institutions to serve as the first line of defense against illicit activity in the global financial system, and that VCs specifically bypass such institutions, the United States needs to adapt its financial regulatory framework to ensure adequate supervision of financial activity; (2) the President should develop principles to prioritize counter terrorist financing among other forms of illicit financial activity and provide recommendations to Congress to address this threat; (3) such principles should include a focus on innovation and public-private partnership; and (4) the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) should consider issuing more guidance and facilitating the establishment of institutions pursuant to sections 314(a) and 314(b) of the USA PATRIOT Act to facilitate greater information flow within and among global banks. SEC. 4. REPORT. The President, acting through the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director of National Intelligence, shall report on the possible exploitation of virtual currencies by terrorist actors. Such report shall include the following elements: (1) Recommendations to update the regulatory oversight structure regarding virtual currencies to address transactions that bypass financial institutions, including banks, Money Services Businesses (MSB), and other financial institutions subject to regulation. (2) Assessment of current efforts by Federal departments and agencies to study and collect intelligence against the terror finance threat and money laundering methodologies. (3) Identification of gaps between Federal and State regulations which could be exploited for illicit funding. SEC. 5. INNOVATION COMPETITION. (a) Authorization.—In order to facilitate public-private partnership to develop and enhance illicit finance prevention systems, the Secretary of the Treasury may establish a program (referred to in this section as “the competition”) to be known as the “Competition for Innovation in Combating Illicit Terrorist Financing”. (b) Activities Supported.—The Competition may carry out, through the provision of grants or an annual reward, the following activities: (1) COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH.—Provide grants, for not more than two years, to engage students, entrepreneurs, and financial experts to identify regulatory solutions with respect to the exploitation of VCs by terrorists and other criminals. (2) COMPETITION.—Establish an annual competition for a reward of not more than $500,000 to any individual, team, or nongovernmental entity that develops technologies to facilitate counter terror threat financing, particularly that addresses the use of VCs or emerging financial technology. (c) Management.— (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Treasury, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall promulgate guidelines for review of grant applications to the Competition. (2) REQUIREMENTS.—The guidelines required under this subsection shall address, at a minimum, the following: (A) Criteria by which grants shall be selected. (B) Policies to ensure that grants are in furtherance of United States security objectives. (d) Acceptance Of Funds From Outside Sources.—The Competition may accept funds from outside sources, including foreign governments, nongovernmental organizations, and private business entities and, without further appropriation, use such funds to carry out the purpose of the Competition. (e) Rule Of Construction.—Nothing in this Act may be construed to make any grant recipient an agent or establishment of the United States Government.
  9. PinnacleAR

    Election Protection Act

    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Mrs. PINNACLE (for herself) introduced the following bill A BILL To amend the Help America Vote Act of 2002 to require States to take steps to ensure domestic ownership and control of election service providers, and for other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the “Election Protection Act''. SEC. 2. ENSURING DOMESTIC OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF ELECTION SYSTEMS. (a) In General.—Title III of the Help America Vote Act of 2002 (52 U.S.C. 21083 et seq.) is amended— (1) by redesignating sections 304 and 305 as sections 305 and 306; and (2) by inserting after section 303 the following new section: ``SEC. 304. ENSURING DOMESTIC OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF ELECTION SYSTEMS. ``(a) Requiring Election Service Providers To Be Qualified.—Each State, unit of local government, or component of a State or unit of local government which is responsible for the administration of an election for Federal office shall ensure that each election service provider who provides, supports, or maintains any component of an election system used in the administration of the election is a qualified election service provider. ``(b) Annual Evaluation To Ensure Compliance.—Each State, unit of local government, or component of a State or unit of local government which is responsible for the administration of an election for Federal office shall, not less frequently than once each calendar year, evaluate each election service provider to ensure that the election service provider is a qualified election service provider. ``(c) Cybersecurity Best Practices.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this section, the Chair of the Commission and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish and publish cybersecurity best practices for election service providers who provide, support, or maintain election systems, and shall establish and publish updates to such best practices at such times as the Chair and the Secretary consider appropriate. ``(d) Guidance and Technical Assistance.— ``(1) In general.—The Chair of the Commission and the Secretary of Homeland Security may provide such guidance and technical assistance as may be appropriate to assist each State, unit of local government, or component of a State or unit of local government which is responsible for the administration of an election for Federal office with its obligations under this section. ``(2) Database of qualified election service providers.—As part of providing guidance and technical assistance under this subsection, the Commission shall establish and maintain a database in which each State, unit of local government, or component of a State or unit of local government which is responsible for the administration of an election for Federal office can verify whether an election service provider is a qualified election service provider. ``(e) Election Service Provider and Qualified Election Service Provider Defined.— ``(1) Election service provider.—In this section, the term `election service provider' means any person providing, supporting, or maintaining an election system on behalf of an election agency, such as a contractor or vendor. ``(2) Qualified election service provider.— ``(A) In general.—In this section, the term `qualified election service provider' means an election service provider who meets each of the following criteria, as established and published by the Chair of the Commission in coordination with the Secretary of Homeland Security: ``(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the election service provider is solely owned and controlled by United States persons or persons described in subparagraph (B). ``(ii) The election service provider submits in accordance with section 3(a) of the Election Protection Act— ``(I) notice of any material change in ownership or control of the election service provider; and ``(II) any other information required to be reported under that section. ``(iii) The election service provider agrees to ensure that the election systems will be developed and maintained in a manner that is consistent with the cybersecurity best practices established under subsection (c). ``(iv) The election service provider agrees to maintain its information technology infrastructure in a manner that is consistent with the cybersecurity best practices established under subsection (c). ``(v) The election service provider shall report any known or suspected security incidents involving election systems to the chief State election official of the State involved or the official's designee, the Chair, and the Secretary. ``(B) Persons described.—For purposes of subparagraph (A)(i), a person described in this subparagraph is a corporation or business entity that is created or organized under the laws of a country that is party to the UK-USA Agreement for joint cooperation in signals intelligence, military intelligence, and human intelligence, also known as the `Five Eyes alliance'. ``(C) Permitting waiver of domestic ownership and control requirement for certain subsidiaries.—The Secretary of Homeland Security may waive the requirement of clause (i) of subparagraph (A) with respect to a person who is a United States subsidiary of a parent company which has implemented a foreign ownership or control mitigation plan that has been approved by the Secretary. Such plan shall ensure that the parent company cannot control, influence, or direct the subsidiary in any manner that would compromise or influence, or give the appearance of compromising or influencing, the independence and integrity of an election. ``(f) Election System Defined.—In this section, the term ‘election system’ means a voting system, an election management system, a voter registration website or database, an electronic pollbook, a system for tabulating or reporting election results, an election agency communications system, or any other information system (as defined in section 3502 of title 44, United States Code) that the Secretary, in consultation with the Commission, identifies as central to the management, support, or administration of a Federal election. ``(g) Ownership and Control Defined.—The Commission, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, shall issue regulations defining the terms `ownership' and `control' for purposes of this section.''. (b) Conforming Amendment Relating to Enforcement.—Section 401 of such Act (52 U.S.C. 21111) is amended by striking ``and 303'' and inserting ``303, and 304''. (c) Clerical Amendments.—The table of contents of such Act is amended— (1) by redesignating the items relating to sections 304 and 305 as relating to sections 305 and 306; and (2) by inserting after the item relating to section 303 the following new item: ``Sec. 304. Ensuring domestic ownership and control of election systems.''. (d) Effective Date.—The amendments made by this section shall apply with respect to elections for Federal office held in 2020 or any succeeding year. SEC. 3. INFORMATION SHARING WITH RESPECT TO OWNERSHIP OF ELECTION SERVICE PROVIDERS. (a) In General.—Each election service provider shall submit to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Election Assistance Commission, and appropriate State or local governmental entities the following: (1) Not later than the date that is 90 days after the later of the date of the enactment of this section or the date that a person first becomes an election service provider, a report listing the identity of any foreign national (as defined in section 319(b) of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30121(b))) who directly or indirectly owns or controls such election service provider and the percentage of such ownership, and any other information necessary to determine whether the election service provider is a qualified election service provider. (2) Not later than 90 days after the date of any material change in ownership or control of such election service provider, a notice of such change and an update of any information previously reported under paragraph (1). (b) Civil Penalty for Failure To Report.—If an election service provider fails to submit a report required under subsection (a), the Attorney General may, after notice and opportunity for hearing, impose a civil fine of $10,000. (c) Definitions.—In this section: (1) Appropriate state or local governmental entity.—The term ``appropriate State or local governmental entity'' means, with respect to an election service provider, any State or local governmental entity that the election service provider seeks to contract with, contracts with, or otherwise provides services to provide, support, or maintain an election system. (2) Election service provider; election system; qualified election service provider.—The terms ``election service provider'', ``election system'', and ``qualified election service provider'' have the meaning given those terms in section 304 of the Help America Vote Act of 2002, as added by section 2.
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    Strike CIA Drones Act

    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Mrs. PINNACLE (for herself, Mr. BURGESS, and Mr. AMASH) introduced the following bill A BILL To prohibit the Central Intelligence Agency from using an unmanned aerial vehicle to carry out a weapons strike or other deliberately lethal action; and to transfer the authority to conduct such strikes or lethal action to the Department of Defense. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the “Strike CIA Drones Act”. SEC. 2. PROHIBITION ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OPERATION OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE STRIKES AND TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. (a) Prohibition.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no officer or employee of, or contractor or detailee to, the Central Intelligence Agency shall use an unmanned aerial vehicle to carry out a weapons strike or other lethal action. (b) Transfer to Department of Defense.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President shall transfer to the Department of Defense all authority to use an unmanned aerial vehicle to carry out a weapons strike or other lethal action.
  11. IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Mrs. PINNACLE (for herself, with thanks to Mrs. FEINSTEIN) introduced the following bill which was referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Technology A BILL To protect the right of the American public under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States to receive news and information from disparate sources by regulating the use of automated software programs intended to impersonate or replicate human activity on social media. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act may be cited as the “Bot Disclosure and Accountability Act”. SEC. 2. FINDINGS. Congress finds the following: (1) According to the Pew Research Center, in 2005, only 5 percent of adults in the United States used online social media, but by 2018, 69 percent of adults in the United States reported using some type of social media, including 88 percent of adults under the age of 29, and 67 percent of adults in the United States reportedly obtained some of their news from social media, including 78 percent of adults under the age of 50. (2) In 2016, a study titled “Social bots distort the 2016 U.S. Presidential election online discussion” found that, during the 2016 United States presidential election, approximately 400,000, or 15 percent, of the users of the social media website Twitter who discussed the election were social media bots. Those bots produced 3,800,000 tweets, which accounted for 19 percent of all tweets regarding the election. (3) In 2017, a report published by researchers from the University of Oxford and the University of Pennsylvania titled “Computational Propaganda in the United States: Manufacturing Consensus Online” noted that, “According to many of the people interviewed for the report, including political bot makers and campaign personnel, the goals of bot-driven tactics are manifold: to create a bandwagon effect, to build fake social media trends by automatically spreading hashtags, and even to suppress the opinions of the opposition.”. (4) In testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, representatives from Twitter reported that, of the 2,752 Twitter accounts associated with the Russian intelligence unit known as the “Internet Research Agency”, more than 47 percent were social media bots. (5) In 2017, the Oxford Internet Institute found that Russian government social media bots were used to manipulate highly targeted and consequential segments of the electorate of the United States. Researchers found that, of all tweets related to the 2016 United States presidential election, Russian propaganda constituted— (A) 40 percent of such tweets directed to Pennsylvania residents; (B) 34 percent of such tweets directed to Michigan residents; (C) 30 percent of such tweets directed to Wisconsin residents; (D) 41 percent of such tweets directed to Florida residents; (E) 40 percent of such tweets directed to North Carolina residents; and (F) 35 percent of such tweets directed to Ohio residents. (6) In Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), the Supreme Court found, “It would be strange indeed, however, if the grave concern for freedom of the press which prompted adoption of the First Amendment should be read as a command that the government was without power to protect that freedom.”. SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS. It is the sense of Congress that the United States Government has a compelling interest in— (1) mitigating the deceptiveness of social media bots, which impersonate human activity online, through public disclosure requirements that impose a minimal burden on rights protected under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; (2) regulating the use of social media bots in political advertising, which is intended to deceive voters and suppress human speech, in a manner that does not— (A) distinguish between political messages based on— (i) content; or (ii) the nature of the person producing a message; or (B) impose any aggregate limit on political speech; and (3) mitigating the effectiveness of efforts by foreign entities to influence United States elections through the use of social media bots to spread misinformation and propaganda. SEC. 4. PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF SOFTWARE PROGRAMS INTENDED TO IMPERSONATE OR REPLICATE HUMAN ACTIVITY. (a) Definitions.— (1) IN GENERAL.—In this section— (A) the term “automated software program or process intended to impersonate or replicate human activity online” has the meaning given the term by the Commission by regulation under paragraph (2); (B) the term “Commission” means the Federal Trade Commission; (C) the term “social media provider” means any person that owns or operates a social media website; and (D) the term “social media website” means any tool, website, application, or other media that connects users on the internet for the purpose of engaging in dialogue, sharing information, collaborating, and interacting. (2) DEFINITION BY REGULATION.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall promulgate regulations under section 553 of title 5, United States Code, to define the term “automated software program or process intended to impersonate or replicate human activity online” broadly enough so that the definition is not limited to current technology. (b) Regulations.—Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Commission shall promulgate regulations under section 553 of title 5, United States Code, to require a social media provider to establish and implement policies and procedures to require a user of a social media website owned or operated by the social media provider to publically disclose the use of any automated software program or process intended to impersonate or replicate human activity online on the social media website. (c) Requirements.—In promulgating regulations under subsection (b), the Commission shall require a social media provider to establish and implement, for each social media website owned or operated by the social media provider— (1) a policy that requires any user of the social media website that employs an automated software program or process intended to impersonate or replicate human activity online on the social media website to provide clear and conspicuous notice of the automated program in clear and plain language to any other person or user of the social media website who may be exposed to activities conducted by the automated program; (2) a process that allows a user of the social media website to provide clear and conspicuous notice to any other person or user as required under paragraph (1); (3) a process to identify, assess, and verify whether the activity of any user of the social media website is conducted by an automated software program or process intended to impersonate or replicate human activity online; (4) a process by which the social media provider will take reasonable preventative and corrective action to mitigate efforts by a user to use an automated software program or process intended to impersonate or replicate human activity online without disclosure as required under paragraph (1), which may include suspension or any other action authorized by the Commission; (5) a process by which the social media provider will remove posts, images, or any other online activity of a user or profile making use of an automated software program or process intended to impersonate or replicate human activity online that is not in compliance with the policy under paragraph (1); and (6) a process that allows a human user of the social media website the opportunity to demonstrate that the online activity of the user is in compliance with the policy required under paragraph (1) prior to, or immediately following, any mitigation activity described in paragraph (4) or (5). (d) Rule Of Construction.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to require any social media provider to permit an automated software program or process intended to impersonate or replicate human activity online on a social media website owned or operated by the social media provider. (e) Enforcement.— (1) UNFAIR OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES.—A violation of a regulation promulgated under subsection (b) shall be treated as a violation of a rule defining an unfair or deceptive act or practice prescribed under section 18(a)(1)(B) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 57a(a)(1)(B)). (2) POWERS OF COMMISSION.— (A) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in subparagraph (C), the Commission shall enforce this section in the same manner, by the same means, and with the same jurisdiction, powers, and duties as though all applicable terms and provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.) were incorporated into and made a part of this section. (B) PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES.—Except as provided in subparagraph (C), any person who violates subsection (b) shall be subject to the penalties and entitled to the privileges and immunities provided in the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.). (C) COMMON CARRIERS AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS.—Notwithstanding section 4, 5(a)(2), or 6 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 44, 45(a)(2), 46) or any jurisdictional limitation of the Commission, the Commission shall also enforce this section, in the same manner provided in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph, with respect to— (i) common carriers subject to the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 151 et seq.) and Acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto; and (ii) organizations not organized to carry on business for their own profit or that of their members. (D) AUTHORITY PRESERVED.—Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the authority of the Commission under any other provision of law. SEC. 5. PROHIBITION ON AUTOMATED SOFTWARE PROGRAMS INTENDED TO IMPERSONATE OR REPLICATE HUMAN ACTIVITY FOR ONLINE POLITICAL ADVERTISING. Title III of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (52 U.S.C. 30101 et seq.) is amended by adding at the end the following new section: “SEC. 325. PROHIBITION ON THE USE OF CERTAIN AUTOMATED SOFTWARE PROGRAMS FOR POLITICAL ADVERTISING. “(a) Prohibition.— “(1) CANDIDATES AND POLITICAL PARTIES.—No candidate (including any authorized committee of a candidate) or political party may— “(A) use or cause to be used any automated software programs or processes intended to impersonate or replicate human activity online to make, amplify, share, or otherwise disseminate any public communication; or “(B) solicit, accept, purchase or sell any automated software programs or processes intended to impersonate or replicate human activity online for any purpose. “(2) POLITICAL COMMITTEES, CORPORATIONS, AND LABOR ORGANIZATIONS.—No political committee, corporation, or labor organization (as defined in section 316(b)) may— “(A) use or cause to be used any automated software programs or processes intended to impersonate or replicate human activity online to make, amplify, share, or otherwise disseminate— “(i) any message that expressly advocates for the election or defeat of a candidate; or “(ii) or any communication which would be an electioneering communication as defined in section 304(f)(1) if such section were applied— “(I) by taking into account communications made over the Internet; “(II) without regard to subparagraph (A)(i)(III) thereof with respect to communications described in subclause (I); and “(III) by treating the facilities of any online or digital newspaper, magazine, blog, publication, or periodical in the same manner the facilities of a broadcasting station for purposes of subparagraph (B)(i); or “(B) solicit, accept, purchase or sell any automated software programs or processes intended to impersonate or replicate human activity online for any purpose described in subparagraph (A). “(b) Exception.—The prohibition in subsection (a) shall not apply to any internal or administrative systems that are not oriented or accessible to the public. “(c) Definition.—For purposes of this section, the term ‘automated software program or process intended to impersonate or replicate human activity online’ has the meaning given such term under section 4 of the Bot Disclosure and Accountability Act of 2018”.”.
  12. Mary Blythe-Pinnacle Member of Congress for Arkansas Twitter | About Me | DC Office
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    Office of the Mary Blythe-Pinnacle

    NEWS — LEGISLATION — TRANSPARENCY — Political Contributions Received: $0 Political Contributions Sent: $0 Lobbyist Relations:
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    @Pinnacle

    Former U.S. Secretary of State, fmr EVP at @LockheedMartin, Chair Emeritus at @PIASP, and Arkansas’s proud Representative in Congress
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    Mary Blythe-Pinnacle

    Mary Blythe-Pinnacle is the former Secretary of State of the United States, wife of former Republican Governor of Arkansas David Pinnacle, and mother of former Congressmen Henry (AR) and Bobby (VA) Pinnacle. She recently served as Executive Vice President of Lockheed Martin and is Chair Emeritus of the Pinnacle Institute for American Security and Prosperity. Education B.A. in Political Science, History, and International Affairs (1976), Egregia Cum Laude - University of Arkansas at Little Rock Master of Public Administration (1978) - Harvard University Juris Doctorate (1981) - Harvard University Work History 1980 - 1981: President, Harvard Law Review, Harvard University (Cambridge, MA) 1982 - 1987: Adjunct Professor of International Law, University of Arkansas School of Law; Professor of Global Affairs, University of Arkansas (Little Rock, AR) 1987 - 1994: Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs and International Security, University of Arkansas (Little Rock, AR) 1993 - 1994: Special Advisor to the President for Global Security & Development, Office of the President of the United States (Washington, DC) 1994 - 1997: Undersecretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, U.S. Department of State (Washington, DC) 1997 - 2001: U.S. Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State (Washington, DC) 2002 - 2010: Co-Founder & Chair, The Pinnacle Institute for American Security and Prosperity (PIASP) (Little Rock, AR) 2010 - 2018: Chair Emeritus, PIASP; Professor Emeritus, University of Arkansans School of Law (Little Rock, AR) 2010 - 2018: Executive Vice President, Lockheed Martin International, Lockheed Martin (Bethesda, MD) Publications “Strong and Wrong: Why Authoritarian Regimes Always Fail” (1987), book “Political Sovereignty: Partisanism as a Destruction of Law and Order” (1992), book “Contemporary Issues in Global Security and Economics” (1993), textbook “Walls: Being America’s Ambassador in a Time of Global Divison” (2002), biography “Death of Democracy: Domestic Conflict as a Cause of Democratic Destruction” (2017), textbook
  16. Character Name: Robert “Bobby” Pinnacle Home State: Virginia Previous Job: Government (Lobbyist, Community Organizer, Former Cabinet Secretary, Agency head, or lower rank) Date of Birth: 01/19/1986 Race / Ethnicity: White Religion: Protestant Christian Wealth: Upper Middle Class Gender: Male Sexuality: Heterosexual Are you married?: Yes How many children do you have?: 1 Robert “Bobby” Pinnacle was born in Searcy, AR to former Arkansas Governor David Pinnacle and former U.S. Secretary of State Mary-Blythe Pinnacle. He is the younger brother to Congressman from Arkansas, Henry Pinnacle. Bobby is married to Samantha Pinnacle (m. 2009) of Quantico, VA and has one son, Jackson “Jack” Pinnacle (4 y/o). Education B.A. in Economics (2004) - University of Arkansas at Fayetteville M.A. in Global Affairs and Russian (2006) - Yale University Work History 2006 - 2007: Analyst, Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury (Washington, DC) 2007 - 2008: Special Analyst, Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, U.S. Department of the Treasury (Washington, DC) 2008 - 2012: Economic Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency (Moscow, Russia) 2012 - Jan. 2018: Senior Intelligence Specialist (Russia/Europe), Central Intelligence Agency (Washington, DC) View full character
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    @PinnacleVA

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    @PinnacleVA

    Official Twitter account for Congressman Robert Pinnacle (R-VA). Tweets by the Congressman are signed “-Bobby”.
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    @PinnacleVA

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    PAWS Act

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    Name Recognition 2

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    Name Recognition 1

    Done
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    Experience 1

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